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INTRODUCTION 
It is estimated that over one billion persons around the world live with some form of 
disability. 1 Persons with disabilities (PWDs) are often discriminated against and 
subjected to more egregious treatment by state and non-state actors. Women and 
girls with disabilities are often maltreated, suffering violence, exploitation, and 
forced sterilization.2 Most of the children with disabilities who live in developing 
countries have no access to education.3 The elderly often live with disabilities, either 
longstanding or appearing with the aging process. 4  In industrialized countries, 
increasing numbers of prisoners are PWDs due to the percentage of inmates with 
mental health needs and the growth in the geriatric inmate population.5 Furthermore, 
the majority of PWDs live in poverty.6 
* Special thanks to Terry Adido (PhD candidate, Faculty of Law, University of Alberta) for his valuable 
research assistance. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Ombudsman 
Institute 10th World Conference, Wellington, New Zealand (November 12-16, 2012). 
** Faculty of Law, University of Alberta, Canada.  
1 WHO & World Bank, World Report on Disability (2011) at 29; Save the Children, See Me, Hear Me: A 
Guide to Using the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to Promote the Rights of 
Children (London: The Save the Children Fund, 2009) at 1 [See Me, Hear Me]; UNICEF Innocenti 
Research Centre, Promoting the Rights of Children with Disabilities (New York: UNICEF, 2007). 
2 UN Human Rights Council, Thematic study on the issue of violence against women and girls and 
disability, UNOHCHR, 20th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/20/5 (2012) [Violence against women and girls and 
disability]. 
3 See Me, Hear Me, supra note 1 at 106 (close to 90% have no formal education); Rangita de Silva de 
Alwis, “Mining the Intersections: Advancing the Rights of Women and Children with Disabilities within 
an Interrelated Web of Human Rights” (2009) 18 Pacific Rim L & Pol’y J 293. 
4 See Arlene S Kanter, “The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its 
Implications for the Rights of Elderly People under International Law” (2008-2009) 25 Georgia State U L 
Rev 527 [CRPD and Rights of Elderly]; Violence against women and girls and disability, supra note 2 at 
para 20 (women more likely to have age-related disabilities given their life spans). 
5 Howard Sapers, “The Office of the Correctional Investigator and Human Rights: Aging, Disordered and 
Aboriginal Offenders in Canadian Federal Corrections”, (Paper delivered at the International Ombudsman 
Institute 10th World Conference, 12-16 November 2012); “In it for life: Old prisoners are suffering from 
poor care—and putting a strain on jails, too”, The Economist (2 March 2013), online: The Economist 
<www.theeconomist.com>; New Zealand Human Rights Commission, Making Disability Rights Real: 
Annual Report of the Independent Monitoring Mechanism of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (2011-2012) at 42-44, online: New Zealand Human Rights Commission <www.hrc.co.nz> 
[New Zealand 2011-2012 Independent Monitoring Mechanism Annual Report]. 
6 Paul Harpur, “Time to be Heard: How Advocates Can Use the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities to Drive Change” (2011) 45 Valparaiso U L Rev 1271 at 1272 [Harpur]. 
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In recent years, the international human rights system has paid greater 
attention to articulating and enforcing the human rights of PWDs. Moving from the 
initial use of medical or welfare models, the international community has adopted a 
social model of disability.7 The social model is reflected in the broad spectrum of 
human rights enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (CRPD) which came into force in 2008.8 
 
 
Article 33(2) of the CRPD requires states parties to establish or designate a 
framework of one or more independent mechanisms to protect, promote, and monitor 
the domestic implementation of their CRPD obligations, taking into account the 
United Nations (UN) Paris Principles on national human rights institutions 
(NHRIs).9 National level human rights commissions and human rights ombudsman 
institutions are the predominant types of NHRIs. 10  However, there are other 
independent non-judicial public sector institutions that can also play a role in 
furthering domestic compliance with the state’s CRPD obligations. These institutions 
are predominantly sub-national human rights ombudsman institutions and human 
rights commissions, national and sub-national classical ombudsman institutions, and 
thematic human rights institutions, such as equality and disability rights bodies. 
Some CRPD parties are establishing multi-institutional article 33(2) frameworks that 
include a NHRI as well as additional institutions. The Committee on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD Committee) is the CRPD’s treaty body and it 
7 The medical model was based on the limitations of individuals due to disability. In contrast, the social 
model looks at how societal barriers circumscribe the lives of PWDs and supports rights that reduce 
barriers to their full participation in society. The social model accepts medical and professional support 
which is seen as promoting the independence and participation of PWDs. See Janet E Lord et al, “Lessons 
from the Experience of U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Addressing the 
Democratic Deficit in Global Health Governance” (2010) 38 J Law, Medicine & Ethics 564 at 566 
[Lessons From CRPD Experience]; Harpur, supra note 6. 
8 Convention the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), GA Res 61/106, UNGAOR, 61st Sess, UN 
Doc A/Res/61/106 (2007) [CRPD]. The CRPD was drafted with the participation of PWDs, their 
representative organizations, and NHRIs. See generally: Arlene S Kanter, “The Promise and Challenge of 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities” (2007) 34 Syracuse J Int’l L & 
Com 287; Janet E Lord & Michael Ashley Stein, “The Domestic Incorporation of Human Rights Law and 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities” (2008) 83 Wash L Rev 449 
[“Domestic Incorporation”];Frédéric Mégret, “The Disabilities Convention: Human Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities or Disability Rights?” (2008) 30 Hum Rts Q 494 [The Disabilities Convention]. 
9 Principles Relating to the Status of National Institutions (The Paris Principles), GA Res 48/134, 
UNOHCHR, 20 December 1993, UN Doc A/RES/48/134 [Paris Principles]. 
10 Linda C Reif, “The Shifting Boundaries of NHRI Definition in the International System” in Ryan 
Goodman & Thomas Pegram, eds, Human Rights, State Compliance, and Social Change: Assessing 
National Human Rights Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 52 [“Shifting 
Boundaries” in Assessing NHRIs]; Linda C Reif, “Transplantation and Adaptation: The Evolution of the 
Human Rights Ombudsman” (2011) 31 B C Third World L J 269 [Transplantation and Adaptation]; 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, National Human Rights Institutions: 
History, Principles, Roles, and Responsibilities (New York, 2010) [National Human Rights Institutions: 
History, Principles, Roles and Responsibilities]. 
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determines whether the frameworks established by CRPD parties comply with 
Article 33(2). In doing so the CRPD Committee applies the Paris Principles which 
have been authoritatively interpreted by the International Coordinating Committee of 
National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (ICC).11 
 
 
Based on the work of the CRPD Committee and ICC, when a CRPD party 
establishes an article 33(2) framework consisting of one institution, it must be a Paris 
Principles compliant national human rights ombudsman or national human rights 
commission. However, the CRPD Committee has not yet squarely addressed whether 
all of the institutions in a multiple mechanism article 33(2) framework must be Paris 
Principles compliant or whether inclusion of one Paris Principles compliant NHRI 
will suffice. This paper will demonstrate how the ICC interpretation of the Paris 
Principles and its accreditation process permits ICC accreditation of only one NHRI 
in a state and usually excludes other independent national and sub-national 
institutions from being classified and accredited as NHRIs. These institutions are not 
considered to be fully Paris Principles compliant because of their sub-national status, 
their thematic human rights focus, and/or their lack of an explicit human rights 
mandate. However, these other independent state institutions can protect and 
promote CRPD rights. 
 
 
To enable CRPD parties to establish the multiple institutional frameworks 
permitted by article 33(2), I argue that a multiple institutional framework should be 
acceptable to the CRPD Committee as long as one of the institutions included in the 
framework is a Paris Principles compliant NHRI, the other institutions included in 
the framework meet most of the Paris Principles’ essential requirements (including 
independence from government and adequate funding), and the multiple institutions 
working together can fulfill the promotion, protection, and monitoring roles required 
by article 33(2). The Paris Principles’ essential requirement that a NHRI must have a 
legal mandate for the promotion and protection of all human rights should be adapted 
in its application to other national and sub-national statutory institutions in a CRPD 
article 33(2) framework to accept a legal mandate that either expressly or in practice 
permits them to promote and/or protect CRPD rights. In this way, classical 
ombudsman institutions, sub-national human rights ombudsman institutions, sub-
national human rights commissions, and thematic human rights institutions can be 
included in a multiple body article 33(2) framework.12 This approach will be applied 
to recommend changes to Canada’s article 33(2) multiple institution framework. 
 
 
 
11 International Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights (ICC), International Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights (ICC), online: <http://nhri.ohchr.org> [ICC Online]. For further details 
on the ICC General Observations on the Paris Principles and its NHRI accreditation process see infra text 
accompanying notes 41-64. 
12 Thematic institutions will not be examined in depth in this article. 
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CATEGORIES OF OMBUDSMAN INSTITUTIONS 
 
Ombudsman institutions can be roughly divided into classical, human rights, and 
thematic human rights ombudsman institutions. They are found at national, sub-
national (in provinces, states, and autonomous communities), and supranational 
European Union (EU) levels of government. National level human rights 
ombudsman institutions qualify as NHRIs which is an important consideration given 
article 33(2) of the CRPD. 
 
 
As ombudsman institutions around the world are being given a variety of 
new roles beyond their original function of combating maladministration, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to place them in clear cut categories. Some human rights 
ombudsman institutions have been designated by their state as a national preventive 
mechanism (NPM) under the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT) and/or a 
CRPD article 33(2) independent mechanism.13 In a few cases, classical ombudsman 
institutions have been given express human rights mandates when they have been 
designated as OPCAT NPMs and/or CRPD article 33(2) mechanisms, giving them 
treaty-derived functions in furthering their state’s compliance with its international 
human rights treaty obligations.14 
 
 
1. Classical Ombudsman Institutions 
 
There are still many ombudsman institutions with mandates that focus on combatting 
maladministration and are silent on human rights protection. The classical 
ombudsman is typically appointed by and reports to the legislature to oversee the 
conduct of the administrative branch of government.15 Most classical ombudsman 
institutions have jurisdiction only over the public sector and have the powers to 
investigate government authorities on receipt of a public complaint or on their own 
motion, make recommendations if illegal or unfair conduct is uncovered, and submit 
annual and special reports to the legislature and the public. 16  Some classical 
13 UN Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights, OPCAT Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture, 
UNOHCHR, 2002, UN Doc GA Res 57/199; Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 18 December 2002, 2375 UNTS 237 
(entered into force 22 June 2006); Association for the Prevention of Torture, “OPCAT Database” (1 
November 2013), online: Association for the Prevention of Torture <www.apt.ch/en/opcat-database> 
[OPCAT Database]. 
14 As of 14 November 2013, classical ombudsman institutions that had been given OPCAT NPM status 
alone or in conjunction with other domestic institutions were Denmark, Luxembourg, Austria, and New 
Zealand, OPCAT Database. However, national ombudsman institutions with CRPD art 33(2) mechanism 
and/or OPCAT NPM designation and no other human rights protection and promotion mandates will not 
obtain the highest ICC NHRI accreditation status, see infra text accompanying note 41. 
15 For further details on the classical ombudsman see Linda C Reif, The Ombudsman, Good Governance 
and the International Human Rights System (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004) at 1-7, 11-19 
[The Ombudsman]. 
16 Ibid. 
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ombudsman institutions also have additional powers, such as undertaking inspections 
of facilities and suspicious death reviews. Classical ombudsman institutions are 
found in many common law countries and in some civil law and mixed 
jurisdictions.17 
 
 
While the bulk of classical ombudsman work addresses domestic law and 
policy, even classical ombudsman institutions occasionally use international and 
domestic human rights law in their work given that classical ombudsman institutions 
apply standards of legality and fairness in their investigations.18 International law 
obligations of the state may be domesticated which permits their application by the 
ombudsman. Fairness standards enable ombudsman institutions to use international 
law norms as examples of state obligation and good practice. The extent to which 
classical ombudsman institutions can and do use international and domestic human 
rights norms depends on a variety of factors.19 
 
 
2. Human Rights Ombudsman Institutions 
 
Human rights ombudsman institutions have express human rights protection 
mandates in their governing legal framework and some are also endowed with 
human rights promotion functions. 20 Human rights ombudsman institutions were 
established initially in Portugal and Spain in the 1970s and the number of these types 
of ombudsman institutions has increased considerably over the past four decades. 
Today, they represent at least fifty percent of total national level ombudsman 
institutions worldwide.21 Human rights ombudsman institutions are found mainly in 
civil law nations.22 They are located in most Latin American and Central/Eastern 
European nations, their numbers are increasing in Western Europe, and they are also 
scattered throughout other parts of the world.23 
 
17 Transplantation and Adaptation, supra note 10 at 280. See also some classical ombudsman institutions 
with multiple mandates that do not include human rights e.g., fighting government corruption, privacy, 
and freedom of information oversight. 
18 The Ombudsman, supra note 15 at 101-112. 
19 Ibid. 
20 While the titles of human rights ombudsman institutions vary (e.g., defender of the people, provider of 
justice, public defender, ombudsman), this paper will use “human rights ombudsman” as the generic term. 
21 Transplantation and Adaptation, supra note 10 at 271-272, 275-279.  
22 Ibid at 277-279. 
23 Ibid. E.g., in Western Europe see human rights ombudsman institutions in Spain, Portugal, Andorra, 
France, Greece, Cyprus, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Austria; Also, the Netherlands Ombudsman has a 
Children’s Ombudsman attached to the institution and Denmark’s Ombudsman has recently been given 
children’s rights protection functions including monitoring compliance with the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child; European Ombudsman, Newsletter No 19, “The Danish Parliamentary Ombudsman’s 
Office Creates a Children’s Division” (November 2012) at 13-14 [European Ombudsman, Newsletter No 
19]. 
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Like the classical ombudsman, the human rights ombudsman is typically 
appointed by the legislature, reports to the legislature, and has the mandate to 
monitor public administration. A few human rights ombudsman institutions also 
have jurisdiction over private sector actors. 24 While some address purely human 
rights matters, others have both human rights functions and classical ombudsman 
administrative justice mandates.25 All human rights ombudsman institutions have the 
power to undertake investigations against public authorities, make recommendations 
for redress, and report to the legislature and the public. Investigations are launched 
on receipt of complaints from members of the public. Many human rights 
ombudsman institutions also have the power to commence their own investigations. 
Further, many human rights ombudsman institutions have additional powers, such as 
inspections of facilities where persons are confined involuntarily, launching court 
actions before constitutional and administrative law courts to determine the 
constitutionality or legality of laws, making law reform proposals to government, 
and human rights education and research. 26  However, some human rights 
ombudsman institutions have only been given traditional ombudsman powers.27 
 
 
Human rights ombudsman institutions apply international and/or domestic 
human rights law in their activities based on domestic constitutional and legal 
frameworks and the international human rights obligations of their state. 28 Many 
human rights ombudsman institutions are located in countries where ratified human 
rights treaties are either automatically part of the domestic legal system or have been 
implemented by constitutional provision and/or statute law.29 
 
 
 
 
24 Transplantation and Adaptation, ibid at 301-302. 
25 Given that all human rights ombudsman institutions have components taken from both the human rights 
commission model and the classical ombudsman model (ombudsman: often single leader, always has 
power to investigate complaints; human rights commission: may have additional human rights 
promotional mandate, may have powers beyond recommendation and reporting, more likely to have 
jurisdiction over private sector), I consider that all human rights ombudsman institutions are “hybrid” 
institutions whether or not their mandate covers only human rights or extends to cover both human rights 
and classical ombudsman administrative justice matters. In contrast, the UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights makes a distinction between human rights ombudsman institutions, on 
the one hand, and “hybrid institutions” on the other hand, on the basis that the former focuses purely on 
human rights while the latter has human rights and additional mandate(s): National Human Rights 
Institutions: History, Principles, Roles and Responsibilities, supra note 10 at 16-18. 
26 Transplantation and Adaptation, supra note 10 at 302-309. 
27 E.g., ombudsman institutions in Greece and Norway; ibid at 298; Norway Parliamentary Ombudsman, 
The Parliamentary Ombudsman online: Norway Parliamentary Ombudsman, 
<www.sivilombudsmannen.no/?lang=en_GB>. 
28 The Ombudsman, supra note 15 at 105. 
29 Ibid at 104. 
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3. Thematic Human Rights Ombudsman Institutions 
 
Some countries have established thematic human rights institutions. Many thematic 
human rights institutions have a legislative basis and they are often structured 
according to the ombudsman, commissioner or commission models. While some 
thematic institutions are appointed by the executive branch of government and may 
have limited jurisdiction and powers, others are legislative appointments with 
considerable independence from government and broader jurisdiction and functions. 
 
 
Some thematic human rights institutions focus on the protection and 
promotion of one category of human rights. The prime example is the equality rights 
body.30 In particular, as a result of EU directives, EU member states have created or 
designated equality bodies that are either stand-alone thematic human rights 
institutions or are part of a broad-based NHRI. 31  Other thematic human rights 
institutions have jurisdiction over one vulnerable population in the nation although 
the  human rights protections cover a full spectrum of rights as they apply to that 
population. For example, there are minority rights commissioners and children’s 
ombudsman institutions.32 
 
 
Disability rights are addressed and protected by equality bodies. Children’s 
rights institutions typically protect children with disabilities as well. A small number 
of countries have established disability rights thematic institutions. In the EU zone, 
Croatia and Malta, for example, have thematic institutions for the protection of 
PWDs.33 Croatia established its Ombudsperson for Persons with Disabilities in 2007 
30 E.g., Sweden Equality Ombudsman, Welcome to the Equality Ombudsman, online: Sweden Equality 
Ombudsman <www.do.se>;  Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, Equality Commission for 
Northern Ireland, online: ECNI <www.equalityni.org>.  
31 Equinet European Network of Equality Bodies, Equinet European Network of Equality Bodies, online: 
Equinet European Network of Equality Bodies <www.equineteurope.org>. See Bruno de Witte, “New 
Institutions for Promoting Equality in Europe: Legal Transfers, National Bricolage and European 
Governance” (2012) 60 Am J Comp Law 49 [New Institutions for Promoting Equality in Europe]. 
32 E.g., Finland Ombudsman for Minorities, Ombudsman for Minorities, online: Ombudsman for 
Minorities <www.ofm.fi>; Norwegian Children’s Ombudsman (Barneombudet), About the Ombudsman, 
online: Barneombudet <www.barneombudet.no/english/>; New Zealand Children’s Commissioner, 
Children’s Commissioner, online: NZ Children’s Commissioner <www.occ.org.nz>. See generally: 
Vanessa Sedletzki, Championing Children’s Rights: A Global Study of Independent Human Rights 
Institutions for Children (Florence: Innocenti Publications, 2012). 
33 EU Fundamental Rights Agency, Fundamental rights: key legal and policy developments in 2011: 
Highlights 2011 (2012) at 29 [FRA Highlights 2011]; EU Fundamental Rights Agency, National Human 
Rights Institutions in the EU Member States: Strengthening the fundamental rights architecture in the EU 
(Luxemburg: Publication Office of the European Union, 2010) at 57. See also: Marianne Schulze, 
“Implementation of Article 33 CRPD in Austria: An Evolving Sense of Action” in Gauthier de Beco, ed, 
Article 33 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: National Structures for the 
Implementation and Monitoring of the Convention (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013) 171 at 178 
[Article 33]. 
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legislation, with the Ombudsperson appointed by and reporting to the legislature.34 
The Croatian Disabilities Ombudsperson has complaint-handling, law reform, human 
rights promotion, and facility inspection powers.35 Malta’s National Commission for 
Persons with Disabilities is appointed by and reports to the executive branch, and its 
statutory duties include the investigation of discrimination complaints, the promotion 
and monitoring of the CRPD, the review of laws, policies and public services, and 
disability rights awareness-raising. 36  New Zealand has a Health and Disability 
Commissioner.37 
 
 
NHRIs AND THE OMBUDSMAN INTERFACE 
 
Over the past two decades, the UN and regional human rights systems have 
supported the establishment of NHRIs to protect and promote human rights at the 
domestic level. As discussed further below, only national level human rights 
commissions and human rights ombudsman institutions are classified as NHRIs.38 
 
 
1. UN Paris Principles 
 
The Paris Principles are the minimum international standards that states are expected 
to apply in establishing and strengthening their NHRIs.39 The Paris Principles require 
inter alia that NHRIs have broad constitutional and/or legislative mandates that 
cover all human rights, independence, a pluralist representation, and adequate 
funding. The Paris Principles also require that NHRIs be given express human rights 
protection and promotion functions that include advice, proposals, and reports to 
government on human rights matters, promoting the harmonization of domestic law 
with the state’s international human rights obligations, human rights public 
awareness raising, and involvement in human rights research and education. The 
34 CRPD, Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Initial Reports 
Submitted by States Parties in Accordance with Article 35 of the Convention, UNOHCHR, 2011, UN Doc 
CRPD/C/HRV/1 at para 235 [Croatia’s Initial CRPD Reports]; Croatia’s Disability Ombudsman, Posi: 
Pravobraniteljica za osobe s invaliditetom, online: <www.posi.hr>; Croatia ratified the CRPD in 2007. 
35 Croatia’s Initial CRPD Reports, ibid. 
36 Malta’s National Commission for Persons with Disabilities, Kummissjoni Nazzionali Persuni 
B’Dizabilita (KNPD), online: KNPD <www.knpd.org>; Equal Opportunities (Persons with Disability) 
Act 2000 (Malta), ch 413; Malta ratified the CRPD in 2012. 
37 The Commissioner is an independent Crown entity, an executive appointment, with the duty to protect 
and promote the rights of health and disability services consumers, e.g., through handling public 
complaints; Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994 (NZ), 1994/88; New Zealand ratified the 
CRPD in 2008. 
38 National Human Rights Institutions: History, Principles, Roles and Responsibilities, supra note 10 at 
15-19. 
39 Paris Principles, supra note 9. 
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Paris Principles are based on an advisory human rights commission model so that 
states are not required to give their NHRIs investigatory powers.40 
 
 
2. Paris Principles Interpretation: ICC General Observations and Accreditation 
Process 
 
The ICC is composed of NHRI representatives who interpret and apply the Paris 
Principles through the drafting of General Observations that flesh out the meaning of 
the Paris Principles. 41 In May 2013, the General Observations were divided into 
three categories, one of which contains those  pertaining to the: “[E]ssential 
requirements of the Paris Principles.”42 The General Observations are directed to 
states and NHRIs for guidance in the establishment and strengthening of NHRIs and 
are also used by the ICC in their NHRI accreditation process. The ICC NHRI 
accreditation process results in applicant NHRIs receiving A-status (full compliance 
with the Paris Principles), B-status (partial compliance with the Paris Principles), or 
C-status (noncompliance with the Paris Principles).43 The accreditation process aims 
to pressure states to reform their NHRIs to comply fully with the Paris Principles 
through the reputational consequences ensuing from low-level or no accreditation 
and use of the rankings as a gatekeeper mechanism because only A-status NHRIs are 
entitled to full participation in UN human rights processes.44 
 
 
In the General Observations, the ICC “acknowledges and encourages the 
trend towards a strong national human rights protection system in a State by having 
one consolidated and comprehensive national human rights institution.”45 Further, 
the General Observations provide for consideration of the accreditation of more than 
40 Ibid at section entitled: “Additional principles concerning the status of commissions with quasi-
jurisdictional competence.” 
41 ICC Online, supra note 11; International Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (ICC), Chart of the Status of National Institutions Accredited 
by the ICC (January 28, 2014), online: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/NHRI/Chart_Status_NIs.pdf > [Status of National 
Institutions]; International Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights (ICC), Report and Recommendations of the Session of the Sub-Committee on 
Accreditation (November 2013), online: <http://nhri.ohchr.org/> [ICC Report and Recommendations May 
2013]. Annex III of each periodic Report contains the General Observations. While it is the ICC’s Sub-
Committee on Accreditation that is responsible for the accreditation process, all references in this paper 
will be to the ICC. 
42 ICC Report and Recommendations, May 2013, ibid, at paras 1, 2, 6. 
43 Status of National Institutions, supra note 41. As of January 28, 2014 there are 70 A-status, 25 B-status, 
and 10 C-status institutions. 
44 “Shifting Boundaries” in Assessing NHRIs, supra note 10 at 56-57; Chris Sidoti, “National Human 
Rights Institutions and the International Human Rights System” in Assessing NHRIs, supra note 10, 93 at 
105-120. 
45 ICC Report and Recommendations May 2013, supra note 41 at General Observation 6.6. 
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one NHRI in a state only in “very exceptional circumstances.”46 While the focus of 
the Paris Principles is on human rights commissions, the ICC, through its General 
Observations, has interpreted the Paris Principles in a manner that has enabled 
national level human rights ombudsman institutions to achieve A-status 
accreditation. Most human rights ombudsman institutions that have applied for ICC 
accreditation have obtained A-status, with the remainder receiving B-status. 47  
Pursuant to ICC interpretation through General Observation 1.2, one of the essential 
requirements of the Paris Principles is that a NHRI should have a mandate that 
covers both human rights promotion and protection functions, and this mandate 
should be interpreted broadly to cover all human rights covered in international and 
domestic law.48 Human rights promotion “include[s] those functions which seek to 
create a society where human rights are more broadly understood and respected”,49 
such as education, training, public outreach, and advice.50 Human rights protection 
responsibilities are “those that address and seek to prevent actual human rights 
violations”, 51 such as monitoring, public inquiries, alternative dispute resolution, 
intervention in court and tribunal proceedings, and the investigation of human rights 
violations through individual complaints-handling and own-motion investigations.52 
Also, a NHRI’s mandate “should…extend to the acts and omissions of both the 
public and private sectors.”53 As described above, some human rights ombudsman 
institutions only have human rights protection functions and many only have 
jurisdiction over the public sector. Past ICC treatment of these limitations is mixed 
and somewhat opaque. 54  Some human rights ombudsman institutions with only 
46 Ibid; Status of National Institutions, supra note 41 at 5-6. There is inconsistency in the ICC 
accreditation system. The United Kingdom has a devolved system of government, but it is still considered 
to be one state under international law. Yet the ICC treats Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Great Britain  as 
separate national “states” for its NHRI accreditation system so that technically there is  accreditation of 
three NHRIs in the United Kingdom. In contrast, Canada, a federal state in which the 13 
provincial/territorial jurisdictions have strong plenary legislative powers over areas of human rights and 
disability issues, is treated as one state for ICC accreditation purposes. 
47 Ibid. In Latin America, only the Honduras human rights commissioner has B-status, while in Europe 
some Central Asian and Central/Eastern European human rights ombudsman institutions have B-status. 
Also, since the ICC General Observations take the position that only one NHRI can represent the state, in 
those European countries that have both a human rights commission/institute and a human rights 
ombudsman (e.g., Greece and France), only the commission/institute in these countries is an accredited 
NHRI. 
48 ICC Report and Recommendations May 2013, supra note 41 at General Observation 1.2. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. See also National Human Rights Institutions: History, Principles, Roles and Responsibilities, 
supra note 10 at 21-22. 
51 ICC Report and Recommendations May 2013, ibid. 
52 Ibid. See also National Human Rights Institutions: History, Principles, Roles and Responsibilities, 
supra note 10 at 22-23. 
53 ICC Report and Recommendations May 2013, ibid. 
54 Opaque in the sense that there are often multiple problematic issues raised by the ICC when NHRIs are 
(re)accredited and there are no express reasons given as to which or how many issues determine the choice 
of an A, B, or C ranking.  
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human rights protection mandates that engage in human rights promotion activities 
in practice have received ICC A-status accreditation, while others that have only 
protective mandates have received B-status.55 Also, some human rights ombudsman 
institutions with jurisdiction only over public sector authorities have obtained A-
status accreditation while others received B-status.56 
 
 
Pursuant to the Paris Principles as interpreted by the ICC, statutory classical 
ombudsman institutions, thematic human rights institutions, and sub-national human 
rights institutions are not NHRIs but are classified as “other domestic institutions 
established for the promotion and protection of human rights.”57 Since the ICC in 
almost all cases accredits only one NHRI for each state, thematic and classical 
ombudsman institutions can only be accredited when their country does not already 
have an accredited NHRI. The thematic human rights institutions that have applied 
have received B- or C-status accreditation.58 A few classical ombudsman institutions 
have applied and most have received C-status accreditation.59 
 
 
However, the Austrian Ombudsman Board (OB) indicated in its ICC 
accreditation application that it interpreted its classical mandate to incorporate 
human rights and was under consideration for OPCAT NPM designation. 60 The 
Austrian OB received B-status accreditation, indicating partial compliance with the 
Paris Principles, although the ICC stated that the OB’s “existing legislation does not 
make specific provision for a broad mandate to protect and promote human rights, 
55 See e.g., ICC, Report and Recommendations of the Session of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation 
(November 19-23, 2012) at 22 (Poland Public Defender, A-status), 27 (Spain Defensor del Pueblo, A-
status) [ICC Report and Recommendations November 2012]; ICC, Report and Recommendations of the 
Session of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation (March 26-30, 2012) at 23 (Peru Defensor del Pueblo, A-
status); ICC, Report and Recommendations of the Session of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation 
(October 25-28, 2011) at 7 (Bulgaria Ombudsman, B-status), 9 (Macedonia Ombudsman, B-status) and 11 
(Argentina’s National Defensor del Pueblo, A-status) [ICC Report and Recommendations October 2011]; 
ICC, Report and Recommendations of the Session of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA) (May 23-
27, 2011) at 16 (Namibia Ombudsman, A-status) [ICC Report and Recommendations May 2011]. 
56 E.g., ICC Report and Recommendations November 2012, ibid. at 27 (Spain Defensor del Pueblo A-
status); ICC, Status of National Institutions, supra note 41; ICC Report and Recommendations October 
2011, ibid at 7 (Bulgaria Ombudsman B-status); ICC Report and Recommendations May 2011, ibid at 11 
(Austria Ombudsman Board, B-status). 
57 Paris Principles, supra note 9 at a section entitled: “Methods of operation”; ICC Report and 
Recommendations May 2013, supra note 41 at General Observation 1.2. 
58 Status of National Institutions, supra note 41. 
59 Ibid (Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, and Puerto Rico Ombudsman institutions received C-status but 
have not applied for reaccreditation, Austrian Ombudsman Board received B-status). 
60 ICC Report and Recommendations May 2011, supra note 55 at 11; Austrian Ombudsman Board, 
Prevention, online: Austrian Ombudsman Board <www.volksanwaltschaft.gv.at/en/human-rights>. The 
Austrian Ombudsman Board was subsequently given OPCAT NPM and CRPD art 33(2) mechanism 
functions [Austrian Ombudsman Board]. 
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and the designated NPM legislation will not, in itself, sufficiently broaden the 
mandate to encompass protection and promotion of human rights.”61 
 
 
In May 2013, the ICC issued a new General Observation on assessing 
NHRIs as national preventive and national monitoring mechanisms. 62  General 
Observation 2.9 addresses the role of NHRIs as national mechanisms under human 
rights treaties such as OPCAT and CRPD article 33(2). It also provides criteria to 
assess the adequacy of the mandate, powers, and resources granted to NHRIs to 
fulfill these additional roles. It indicates that the ICC may consider any “guidance” 
issued by the “relevant treaty body.”63 However, General Observation 2.9 is silent on 
whether the inclusion of a national level classical ombudsman and/or a thematic or 
sub-national institution in a multiple institution national preventive/monitoring 
mechanism would boost its ICC accreditation ranking. Rather, the General 
Observation states that the NHRI will be assessed on the Paris Principles. 64  
Accordingly, the approach used with the Austrian OB application discussed above 
will likely continue to be used by the ICC. In particular, classical ombudsman 
institutions, thematic human rights institutions, and sub-national human rights 
institutions designated as CRPD article 33(2) mechanisms will still have to comply 
with the essential elements of the Paris Principles before they can ever hope to 
achieve A-status, and they will be unable to do so given the Paris Principles 
requirement for a broad human rights protection and promotion mandate at the 
national level. 
 
 
Thus, unless the ICC changes its practice, only one NHRI in a state will be 
accredited by the ICC except in very exceptional circumstances. It will be extremely 
rare for additional institutions in a state to be ICC accredited and receive an 
authoritative determination on the level of their compliance with the Paris Principles. 
Further, the Paris Principles and ICC practice prevents independent national level 
thematic human rights institutions, independent national level classical ombudsman 
institutions without an express and broad human rights mandate, and all independent 
sub-national level human rights institutions and classical ombudsman institutions in 
federal or decentralized states from receiving anything other than a B- or C-status if 
they are permitted to apply for ICC accreditation. As a result, only one national level 
human rights commission or human rights ombudsman with broad human rights 
protection and promotion functions and other Paris Principles compliant features 
within each state can obtain ICC A-status accreditation. 
 
 
61 Austrian Ombudsman Board, ibid. 
62 ICC Report and Recommendations May 2013, supra note 41 at General Observation 2.9. Art 33(2) of 
the CRPD does not make any express reference to “national” mechanisms. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ON THE RIGHTS OF 
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 
 
1. Evolution of UN Treaties and Instruments 
 
While all of the UN human rights treaties and other instruments apply to PWDs, the 
reality is that prior to the CRPD, few made specific reference to them. 65 While 
human rights treaties have non-discrimination provisions, given their vintage, 
disability is not expressly listed as a prohibited ground of discrimination, although it 
falls under general terms that prohibit discrimination on any other ground. Also, the 
rights of PWDs had to be slotted into more broadly framed rights such as the right to 
health and women’s equality rights.66 The Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) was the first UN treaty to contain a specific disability right, covering matters 
such as care, conditions of life, health, and education of disabled children.67 
 
 
2. Overview of Regional Human Rights Law 
 
There is also regional international law on the rights of PWDs. For example, Europe 
has a multi-part regional system. The Council of Europe’s (COE) European 
Convention on Human Rights system, the European Court of Human Rights, and the 
Commissioner on Human Rights play important roles in disability rights 
protection.68 In addition, the evolving human rights protection elements of the EU 
are important for protecting disability rights through, for example, the non-
discrimination obligations in the treaty law, the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
provisions, directives combating discrimination implemented through member state 
equality bodies, and the research and advice of the EU’s Agency for Fundamental 
Rights (FRA).69 
65 See e.g., soft law instruments on the disabled, See Me, Hear Me, supra note 1 at 14; Lessons from 
CRPD Experience, supra note 7 at 566. I.e., most are based on a medical model. 
66 E.g. Paul Hunt & Judith Mesquita, “Mental Disabilities and the Human Right to the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Health” (2006) 28 HRQ 332; Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW), GA Res 34/180, UNGAOR, 1979, UN Doc A/RES/34/180; CEDAW 
Committee, General Recommendation No 18 Disabled Women (1991), online: United Nations Office of 
the High Commissioner of Human Rights <www.ohchr.com>. 
67 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, Can TS 1992 No 3, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered 
into force 2 September 1990), art 23, 2(1). See also: Convention on the Rights of the Child Committee, 
General Comment No 9 (2006): The Rights of Children with Disabilities, UNOHCHR, 2007, UN Doc 
CRC/C/GC/9. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res. 61/295, 
UNGAOR, 2007, UN Doc A/RES/61/295, art 22. 
68 European Convention on Human Rights, 4 November 1950, Rome, 4.XI.1950 [ECHR]. The ECHR’s  
protocols are also relevant. See also European Social Charter (Revised)(1997), 36 ILM 34, art 15; Council 
of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights and Disability: Equal rights for all, 
CommDH/IssuePaper(2008)2 (2008); Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights, Third party 
intervention by the COE Commissioner for Human Rights under para 3, art 36 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights: Application No 47848/08–The Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of 
Valentin Campeanu v Romania, CommDH(2011)37 (2011).  
69 EC, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, [2010] OJ C 83/13 [TEU]; EC, Treaty of 
the Functioning of the of the European Union, [2010] OJ C 83/47 (entered into force on 1 December 
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In the Americas, the American Convention on Human Rights, its Protocol 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Inter-American Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Persons With Disabilities 
provide some protection for PWDs.70 The African counterpart is the African Charter 
of Human and Peoples’ Rights with its remedial machinery.71 
 
 
3. UN CRPD 
 
The CRPD is based on a social, rights-based model for PWDs, with the view that 
“the full participation in society for people with disabilities will be achieved not by 
“fixing” people, but by breaking down the barriers that prevent realization of equal 
opportunity, full participation and respect for difference.”72 By March 22, 2014, the 
CRPD had 143 parties. The EU is a CRPD contracting party, and all of its member 
states have also signed the treaty.73 
 
 
The CRPD considers that persons with disabilities “include those who have 
long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction 
with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an 
equal basis with others.” 74 This is an inclusive and open-ended approach to the 
application of the CRPD.75 The general principles of the CRPD are: respect for the 
inherent dignity, individual autonomy, and independence of PWDs, non-
discrimination, equality of opportunity, gender equality, accessibility, full and 
effective participation and inclusion in society, and respect for difference and 
acceptance of PWDs as part of human diversity and humanity. 
 
2009) [TFEU]; EC, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, [2000] OJ 2000/C 364/01, 
arts 21 (non-discrimination), 25 (rights of the elderly), 26 (integration of persons with disabilities); New 
Institutions for Promoting Equality in Europe, supra note 31. 
70 American Convention on Human Rights, 18 July 1978, OASTS No 36, 1144 UNTS 123; Additional 
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, 16 November 1999, OASTS No 69, art 18; Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, GA Res 1608, 19th Sess, OEA Doc 
OEA/Ser.AG/doc 3826/99, (1999) (entered into force 14 September 2001). 
71 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27 June 1981, 1520 UNTS 245, art 18(4) (entered into 
force 21 October 1986). 
72 Lessons from CRPD Experience, supra note 7 at 568. 
73 Entered into force for the EU on January 22, 2011. By March 22, 2014, 25 of the 28 EU member states 
had ratified the CRPD. See generally Gráinne de Búrca, “The European Union in the Negotiation of the 
UN Disability Convention” (2010) 35 European L Rev 174; FRA, Fundamental rights: challenges and 
achievements in 2012 (2013) at 140 [FRA, Fundamental Rights 2012]. 
74 CRPD, supra note 8, art 1. 
75 See Me, Hear Me, supra note 1 at 2. 
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Many CRPD provisions protect PWDs against discrimination in the public 
sector. State obligations include the adoption or repeal of laws and administrative 
measures, training of staff, raising public awareness, ensuring public authorities and 
institutions act in conformity with the CRPD, providing services and assistance, and 
“mainstreaming” disability rights in all programs and policies. 76 The CRPD also 
extends state obligations to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
that takes place in the private sphere.77 State parties are required to “closely consult 
with and actively involve persons with disabilities, including children with 
disabilities, through their representative organizations” in the development and 
implementation of legislation and policies to implement the CRPD, as well as 
through other decision-making processes concerning issues relating to PWDs.78 
 
 
Equality and non-discrimination rights are used throughout the CRPD and 
the treaty contains civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights that, while 
based on rights in existing human rights treaties, are sometimes adjusted or expanded 
to address the specific issues faced by PWDs.79 For example, all discrimination on 
the basis of disability (both direct and indirect) is prohibited and states must “take all 
appropriate steps to ensure that reasonable accommodation is provided.”80 There is a 
right to accessibility whereby states must take measures to ensure PWDs have access 
on an equal basis with others to the physical environment, transportation, public 
infrastructure, public facilities and services, and signage in public facilities in 
Braille, as well as easy to read and understand formats. 81  The right to equal 
recognition before the law in article 12 includes safeguards for PWDs concerning the 
exercise of legal capacity including using the supported decision-making approach 
rather than guardianship or substitute decision-making.82 The right to freedom from 
exploitation, violence, and abuse applies inside and outside the home and also covers 
gender-based aspects of such behaviour.83 Other rights include independent living 
and inclusion in the community, personal mobility, freedom of expression, and equal 
76 CRPD, supra note 8. For an extensive listing of relevant state measures in the CRPD see The 
Disabilities Convention, supra note 8 at 506. 
77 CRPD, ibid art 4(1)(b), (e). 
78 CRPD, ibid art 4(3). 
79 CRPD, ibid. There is some debate about the extent to which the CRPD creates new rights: see The 
Disabilities Convention, supra note 8 and Lessons from CRPD Experience, supra note 7 at 569. 
80 CRPD, ibid arts 2, 5(3). 
81 CRPD, ibid art 9. 
82 CRPD, ibid art 12: “essentially creates a continuum of support, thereby acknowledging that some 
disabled people require no support in making decisions, while others may need intensive support”, 
Lessons from CRPD Experience, supra note 7 at 573. Various CRPD state parties have made reservations 
or interpretative declarations to art 12. See e.g., Peter Bartlett, “The UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities and Mental Health Law” (2012) 75 Modern Law Rev 752. 
83 CRPD, ibid art 16. 
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rights with respect to fertility and child-rearing. 84 Economic, social, and cultural 
rights include the rights to education, health, habilitation, and rehabilitation.85 Article 
6 of the CRPD focuses on women and girls with disabilities and article 7 on children 
with disabilities, with the best interests of the child principle found in this and other 
sections of the CRPD.86  
 
 
The CRPD Committee examines and makes recommendations on the 
periodic reports submitted by the CRPD state parties on measures they have taken to 
comply with the treaty. The Committee can make general recommendations that give 
a deeper interpretation of specific CRPD provisions.87 The Optional Protocol to the 
CRPD, which establishes individual complaint and inquiry mechanisms using the 
CRPD Committee, had 80 states parties by March 22, 2014.88 
 
 
CRPD ARTICLE 33(2) FRAMEWORK OF INDEPENDENT MECHANISMS 
 
1. CRPD Article 33(2) 
 
CRPD article 33(2) states: 
 
States Parties shall, in accordance with their legal and administrative 
systems, maintain, strengthen, designate or establish within the State 
Party, a framework, including one or more independent mechanisms, as 
appropriate, to promote, protect and monitor implementation of the 
present Convention. When designating or establishing such a mechanism, 
States Parties shall take into account the principles relating to the status 
and functioning of national institutions for protection and promotion of 
human rights.89  
 
Further, article 33(3) states that civil society, in particular PWDs and their 
organizations, shall be involved and participate fully in the domestic monitoring 
process. 
84 CRPD, ibid arts 19-23. 
85 CRPD, ibid arts 24-26. Art 4(2) states that “economic, social and cultural rights are to be progressively 
realized although this is without prejudice to those rights that are immediately applicable pursuant to 
international law.” 
86 CRPD, ibid. 
87 CRPD, ibid, arts 34-39. See Michael Ashley Stein & Janet E Lord, “Monitoring the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Innovations, Lost Opportunities, and Future Potential” (2010) 32:3 
HRQ 689. 
88 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2006, 46 ILM 463 
(entered into force May 3, 2008). 
89 CRPD, supra note 8. See also CRPD, art 16(3) which requires parties to ensure that all facilities and 
programs for PWDs are effectively monitored by independent authorities to prevent violence, abuse, and 
exploitation. 
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Article 33(2) permits the designation of institutions that already exist or the 
establishment of new institutions, and either one body or multiple institutions can be 
used to constitute the framework. Article 33(2) refers to the Paris Principles by using 
their formal title, and states that   they must be “taken into account” in establishing or 
designating the independent mechanism(s).90 As Lord and Stein state: 
 
NHRIs should be regarded as crucial actors in the domestic-level 
implementation of the Convention, given their typically broad mandates to 
participate in the drafting of new legislation, review existing legislation, 
implement education and awareness-raising campaigns, and undertake 
investigative and quasi-judicial functions.91 
 
 
2. Article 33(2) Framework Variations: Single and Multiple Institution 
Frameworks 
 
To date, a variety of human rights commissions/institutes have been designated as 
article 33(2) independent mechanisms, either alone or as one of multiple institutions. 
These include Australia’s Human Rights Commission, the German Institute for 
Human Rights, four human rights and equality commissions in the United Kingdom, 
Mexico’s national and state-level human rights commissions, and South Korea’s 
National Human Rights Commission.92 Similarly, some human rights ombudsman 
90 Paris Principles, supra note 9. See Gauthier de Beco, “Article 33(2) of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Another Role for National Human Rights Institutions?” (2011) 29:1 
Nethl QHR 84 at 86 [Article 33(2)]; However, see: “Domestic Incorporation”, supra note 8 at 464 
(reference to Paris Principles rejected by drafters). 
91 “Domestic Incorporation”, ibid. 
92 Rachel Murray & Kelley Johnson, “Implementation of Article 33 CRPD in the United Kingdom: The 
Need to Consolidate Civil Society Engagement” in Article 33, supra note 33, 97 at 102; Gauthier de Beco, 
Study on the Implementation of Article 33 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
in Europe (UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Europe Regional Office, 2011) 
[CRPD Article 33 Implementation in Europe]; ICC and Canadian Human Rights Commission, Survey of 
National Human Rights Institutions on Article 33.2 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (August 2011) at 18, 53 [Survey of NHRIs]; CRPD Committee, Implementation of the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Initial reports submitted by States parties in 
accordance with article 35 of the Convention: Australia, CRPD, UN Doc CRPD/C/AUS/1 (2012) 213-214 
(ICC A-status); CRPD Committee, Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, Initial reports submitted by States parties in accordance with article 35 of the Convention: 
Germany, CRPD,UN Doc CRPD/C/DEU/1 (advance, unedited version, August 3, 2011) 54 (ICC A-
status); CRPD Committee, Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
Initial reports submitted by States parties in accordance with article 35 of the Convention: Mexico, 
CRPD, UN Doc CRPD/C/MEX/1 (advance, unedited version, in Spanish), at 241 (national level 
Commission has ICC A-status); CRPD Committee, Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, Initial reports submitted by States parties in accordance with article 35 of the 
Convention: United Kingdom, CRPD, UN Doc CRPD/C/GBR/1 (advance, unedited version, no date), at 
350 (Equality and Human Rights Commission has A-status, Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission 
has A-status, Equality Commission of Northern Ireland has not applied for ICC accreditation, Scotland 
Human Rights Commission has A-status); CRPD Committee, Implementation of the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Initial reports submitted by States parties in accordance with article 
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institutions, either alone or as one of several institutions, have been designated as 
article 33(2) mechanisms. These include Latvia’s Ombudsman, Azebaijan’s Human 
Rights Commissioner, Cyprus’ Commissioner for Administration, France’s Defender 
of Rights, and Croatia’s human rights ombudsman.93 Most of these national level 
human rights commissions and human rights ombudsman institutions have already 
obtained ICC A-status accreditation or have the capacity to achieve full compliance 
with the Paris Principles as they stand or with some adjustments. 
 
 
However, a number of states have designated national level thematic 
disability rights institutions as the sole mechanism or one of a multiplicity of 
mechanisms for their article 33(2) framework. For example, Malta’s National 
Commission for Persons with Disabilities has been formally designated as the 
country’s article 33(2) mechanism. 94  Also, some otherwise classical national 
ombudsman institutions have been included as part of a multiple article 33(2) 
institutional framework. These include Denmark’s Parliamentary Ombudsman, 
Senegal’s Mediator, New Zealand’s Ombudsmen, and Luxembourg’s Mediator.95 In 
all four cases, the ombudsman institution is used in conjunction with an ICC A-status 
or B-status accredited human rights commission. 
 
 
In federal and decentralized states, some or all disability matters may fall 
within the legislative purview of the sub-national levels of government, and the sub-
35 of the Convention: Republic of Korea, CRPD, UN Doc CRPD/C/KOR/1 (advance, unedited version, 
June 22, 2011), at 168 (A-status). 
93 Survey of NHRIs, ibid (Latvia Ombudsman has not applied for ICC accreditation); CRPD Committee, 
Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Initial reports submitted by 
States parties in accordance with article 35 of the Convention: Azerbaijan, CRPD, UN Doc 
CRPD/C/AZE/1 (advance, unedited version, January 2011) 56 (A-status); CRPD Committee, 
Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Initial reports submitted by 
States parties in accordance with article 35 of the Convention: Croatia, CRPD, 2011, UN Doc 
CRPD/C/HRV/1, at 234-235 (A-status); FRA, Fundamental Rights 2012, supra note 73 at 148-149 
(Cyprus’ Commissioner and France’s Defender of Rights are not ICC accredited; however, France’s 
human rights commission was already ICC-accredited when Defender of Rights established). 
94 Equal Opportunities (Persons with Disability) Act 2000 (Malta), supra note 36, s 22(s). However, see 
CRPD states that have established thematic institutions which are housed within ministries and operate 
with government representatives who provide more than advice. These institutions have been criticized for 
their lack of independence and a structure that is more fitting for a CRPD art 33(1) government focal 
point; Delia Ferri, “Implementation of Article 33 CRPD in Italy: Magna Pars est Profectus Velle 
Proficiere” in Article 33, supra note 33, 119 at 136, 141 (National Observatory on the Situation of Persons 
with Disabilities); Aleksandra Tabaj & Cveto Uršič, “Implementation of Article 33 in Slovenia: A Feeling 
of Confusion” in Article 33, supra note 33, 149 at 158-165 (Council for Persons with Disabilities).  
95 Maria Ventegodt Liiberg, “Implementation of CRPD Article 33 in Denmark: The Sails Are up, but 
Where is the Wind?” in Article 33, supra note 33, 69 at 82 (Danish Institute for Human Rights with ICC 
A-status accreditation, Parliamentary Ombudsman and Danish Disability Council); Survey of NHRIs, 
supra note 92 at 12-14; New Zealand Ombudsman, 2010/2011 Report of the Ombudsman, 30 June 2011, 
online: New Zealand Parliament <http://www.parliament.nz/> at 12, 48. See also Austria’s Ombudsman 
Board, Powers to monitor institutions and facilities where PWDs may be abused, subject to violence or 
inhuman treatment and deprived of their liberty, online: <http://www.volksanwaltschaft.gv.at/en/human-
rights>. The mediator is the Francophone version of the ombudsman institution. 
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national governments may have the constitutional jurisdiction to designate article 
33(2) independent mechanisms. In these types of nations, multiple institution article 
33(2) frameworks may be necessary to implement CRPD obligations fully. The 
situation is complicated given that in some of these nations, the constitutional 
architecture may give the NHRI overlapping jurisdiction over sub-national and 
national government authorities, while in a few nations the NHRI has no jurisdiction 
over sub-national actors.96 An example of the latter is Canada, a CRPD contracting 
party.97 If Canada uses only federal institution(s) for its article 33(2) framework, then 
large swaths of provincial/territorial governmental conduct will be outside the 
jurisdiction of the article 33(2) mechanism. The Canadian government has 
recognized this dilemma in its CRPD declaration/reservation:  
 
Canada interprets Article 33(2) as accommodating the situation of federal 
states where the implementation of the Convention will occur at more than 
one level of government and through a variety of mechanisms, including 
existing ones.98 
 
Thus, in a number of federal and decentralized states, sub-national institutions exist 
and have full or shared jurisdiction over PWD issues. These institutions play an 
important role in monitoring and implementing CRPD and other disability rights 
inside the nation. Yet, as discussed above, no sub-national statutory human rights 
institution or classical ombudsman can ever be deemed to fully comply with the 
Paris Principles.  
 
 
The situation is also problematic when it comes to the EU’s plural article 
33(2) framework. The Commission has designated five bodies for the framework; 
specifically the European Parliament Petitions Committee, European Ombudsman, 
European Commission, FRA, and European Disability Forum.99 The EU’s European 
Ombudsman will engage in CRPD rights protection through its classical 
investigatory mandate to combat maladministration in EU institutions, bodies, 
offices, and agencies. The European Ombudsman defines maladministration to 
include noncompliance with EU law, which includes EU human rights obligations in 
96 Andrew Wolman, “The relationship between national and sub-national human rights institutions in 
federal states” (2013) 17:4 Int’l J HR 445.  It is most common to find both a NHRI and sub-national 
human rights institutions in federal states.  
97 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 92. Canada ratified  
the CRPD on March 11, 2010. 
98 CPRD, UN Treaty Collection Databases, online; United Nations Treaty Collection 
<http://treaties.un.org/>; Chantal Collin, “Canada and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities” Library of Parliament Research Publications, Hill Note No 2012-89-E (5 December 2012); 
online: Parliament of Canada <http://www.parl.gc.ca/>. As of March 22, 2014, no other federal states had 
made similar declarations/reservations.  
99 FRA, Fundamental Rights 2012, supra note 73 at 139, 149. See FRA, FRA reports on disability rights, 
online: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights <http://fra.europa.eu>. The CRPD applies to the 
EU administration in areas where the EU has legal competence and EU internal matters, e.g., employment. 
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the Charter of Fundamental Rights.100 The Paris Principles were drafted to apply to 
states’ domestic systems based on a democratic foundation where NHRI 
independence from the executive/administrative branch of government can be 
achieved through links with the legislature. In contrast, the EU is a supranational 
governance system where law making is shared by multiple institutions, including 
executive/administrative institutions.101 
 
 
Also, article 33(3) states that PWD organizations must participate and be 
fully involved in the monitoring process. While it does not expressly state that they 
can be part of the article 33(2) framework, formal designation of one or more PWD 
organizations as article 33(2) mechanisms may be the most inclusive way to involve 
PWDs in the monitoring process.102 A PWD organization can never comply with the 
Paris Principles because it is considered a private civil society organization, despite 
the fact that it is a body independent of government. 
 
 
3. CRPD Article 33(2) Single and Multiple Institution Frameworks, the CRPD 
Committee, and the Paris Principles 
 
As discussed above, some CRPD parties are creating multiple mechanism article 
33(2) frameworks as permitted by its terms. Article 33(2) states that the Paris 
Principles must be “taken into account” in structuring the mechanisms. However, 
based on current ICC practice, barring “very exceptional circumstances”, only one 
domestic institution in a nation will be accredited as a NHRI with the possibility of 
achieving A-status. 103 Does the wording of article 33(2) permit the inclusion of 
independent ombudsman and human rights institutions that cannot obtain ICC 
accreditation and/or achieve full compliance with the Paris Principles together with a 
Paris Principles compliant NHRI? 
 
 
The views of the CRPD Committee are authoritative in the context of the 
interpretation and application of the CRPD. The CRPD Committee has begun to 
issue its concluding observations on the periodic reports submitted by CRPD states 
and has included comments and recommendations on article 33(2) frameworks. By 
March 22, 2014, a small number of CRPD contracting parties had received 
concluding observations on their first periodic reports. Spain was one of the first 
states to be reviewed by the Committee. Spain indicated that it had designated the 
National Disability Council as the state body responsible for the implementation of 
100 TFEU, supra note 69, art 228; EC, Decision of the European Parliament on the Regulations and 
General Conditions Governing the Performance of the Ombudsman’s Duties, [1994] OJ, L 113, online: 
European Ombudsman <www.ombudsman.europa.eu>; see The Ombudsman, supra note 15 at 367-391 on 
classical ombudsman structure of European Ombudsman. 
101 Karen Davies, Understanding European Union Law, 5th ed (New York: Routledge, 2013) at 53-62.  
102 See e.g., New Zealand and Denmark; see text infra accompanying notes 142-149 and supra note 95. 
103 ICC Report and Recommendations May 2013, supra note 41 at General Observation 6.6. 
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the CRPD but made no mention of its national human rights ombudsman, the 
Defensor del Pueblo, which has ICC A-status accreditation.104 In September 2011, 
Royal Decree 1276/2011 stated that without prejudice to the powers of the Defensor 
del Pueblo, CERMI (Committee of Representatives of Persons with Disabilities) was 
appointed as Spain’s article 33(2) mechanism.105 In its Concluding Observations on 
Spain’s report, the CRPD Committee stated that Spain’s independent monitoring 
mechanisms were in full compliance with article 33(2), without any discussion either 
of the makeup of the mechanisms or of the Paris Principles.106 
 
 
In contrast, the Committee has relied on the Paris Principles in their other 
concluding observations on article 33(2). Tunisia reported that it had designated the 
Higher Committee for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, a broad-based 
NHRI that has ICC B-status accreditation. 107  In response, the Committee 
recommended that Tunisia ensure that the Higher Committee complies with the Paris 
Principles and establish a dedicated unit on disabilities inside the NHRI.108 Some 
states parties had designated government agencies as their article 33(2) mechanisms. 
In these cases, the Committee expressed concern that the agency lacked 
independence or stated that it did not comply with article 33(2) and the Paris 
Principles, presumably due to insufficient independence.109 
 
104 Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Initial reports submitted 
by States parties in accordance with article 35 of the Convention: Spain, CRPD, 6th Sess, UN Doc 
CRPD/C/ESP/1, (2011) 252-253; FRA, Fundamental Rights 2012, supra note 73 at 148; Status of 
National Institutions, supra note 41 at 6; Francisco J. Bariffi, “Implementation of Article 33 CRPD in 
Spain: A Rather Erratic and Improvised Experience” in Article 33, supra note 33, 193 at 203-204 [Bariffi]. 
105 Bariffi, ibid at 204-205. It was reported that on Spain’s appearance before the Committee, it designated 
the Defensor del Pueblo as its art 33(2) mechanism, however–while the Defensor does use the CRPD in 
its work–there is no indication that it is doing so as a result of a formal designation. See Meredith Raley, 
“Spain and Article 33.2 of the CRPD” (24 November 2011), online: Disability and Human Rights: 
<http://disabilityandhumanrights.com>; Spain Defensor del Pueblo,“Resumen Informe Anual” (2012), 
online: Spain Defensor del Pueblo <www.defensordelpueblo.es> at 50, 60 [Resumen Informe Anual]. 
106 CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities: Spain, CRPD, 6th Sess, UN Doc CRPD/C/ESP/CO/1, (2011) 6. 
107 Status of National Institutions, supra note 41 at 7(“Comité Supérieur des Droits de l’Homme et des 
Libertés Fondamentales”). 
108 CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities: Tunisia, CRPD, 5th Sess, UN Doc CRPD/C/TUN/CO/1, (2011) 41-42 [Concluding 
Observations: Tunisia]. Tunisia also used specialized institutions to protect PWDs, but the CRPD 
Committee was concerned with their independence and the low participation of PWDs in their activities, 
ibid at 41. 
109 Ibid at 41; CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations on the initial report of Argentina as approved 
by the Committee in its eighth session, CRPD, 8th Sess, UN Doc CRPD/C/ARG/CO/1, (2012) 51 
[Concluding Observations: Argentina]; CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations on the initial report 
of Paraguay, adopted by the Committee as its ninth session, 15-19 April 2013, CRPD, 9th Sess, UN Doc 
CRPD/C/PRY/CO/1, (2013) 75 [Concluding Observations: Paraguay]; CRPD Committee, Concluding 
Observations on the initial report of El Salvador, adopted by the Committee at its tenth session (2-13 
September 2013), CRPD, 10th Sess, UN Doc CRPD/C/SLV/CO/1, (2013) 67-70 [Concluding 
Observations: El Salvador]. 
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Common themes running throughout the Committee’s recommendations to 
date on article 33(2) include: a national monitoring mechanism should be 
established, it must comply with both the Paris Principles and article 33(2) with an 
emphasis on the mechanism’s independence, and PWDs and their representative 
organizations must participate fully in the mechanism and the monitoring process.110 
In its Concluding Observations on Austria’s report, the CRPD Committee also 
recognized its federal structure, recommending that the sub-national “Länder create 
their own independent monitoring mechanisms to further coordinate disability 
policies and practices throughout Austria.” 111  However, the Committee did not 
explicitly confirm whether any sub-national mechanisms could be included in the 
country’s article 33(2) framework and it did not refer to the Paris Principles in 
relation to the independence of sub-national institutions.  
 
 
The CRPD Committee has not issued a clear statement concerning whether 
all the mechanisms in a multiple mechanism article 33(2) framework have to comply 
fully with the Paris Principles as interpreted by the ICC, or whether one Paris 
Principles compliant NHRI in a multiple mechanism framework will suffice. Also 
the Committee has not issued a General Comment on article 33(2).112 The ICC’s 
General Observation 2.9 is of no assistance to the Committee. General Observation 
2.9 on national preventive/monitoring mechanisms focuses only on NHRIs that have 
been designated as or as part of a national monitoring mechanism. 113  General 
Observation 2.9 recognizes that it is for the relevant treaty body (i.e., the CRPD 
Committee) to assess a particular framework mechanism within its treaty context.114  
 
 
110 Concluding Observations: Tunisia, ibid at 42; Concluding Observations: El Salvador, ibid, at 70; 
CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: 
Peru, CRPD, 7th  Sess, UN Doc CRPD/C/PER/CO/1, (2012) 49; Concluding Observations: Argentina, 
ibid, at 52; CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations on the initial report of China, adopted by the 
Committee at its eighth session (17-28 September 2012), CRPD, 8th Sess, UN Doc CRPD/C/CHN/CO/1, 
(2012) 50, 84; CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations on the initial periodic report of Hungary, 
adopted by the Committee at its eighth session (17-28 September 2012), CRPD, 8th  Sess, UN Doc 
CRPD/C/HUN/CO/1 (2012) 51-52; Concluding Observations: Paraguay, ibid. at 76; CRPD Committee, 
Concluding Observations on the initial report of Australia, adopted by the Committee at its tenth session 
(2-13 September 2013), CRPD, 10th Sess, UN Doc CRPD/C/AUS/CO/1, (2013) 57-58. Australia lacks a 
participatory and responsive CRPD monitoring and implementing structure; CRPD Committee, 
Concluding observations on the initial report of Austria, adopted by the Committee at its tenth session, 
CRPD, 10th Sess, UN Doc CRPD/C/AUT/CO/1, (2013) 52-54. The federal Independent Monitoring 
Committee designated by Austria lacks both the independence required by the Paris Principles and its 
own budget;  Article 33, supra note 33 at 177-187. 
111 Concluding Observations: Austria, ibid at 53. 
112 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Comments, online: 
<http://www.ohchr.org>.  
113 ICC Report and Recommendations May 2013, supra note 41 at General Observation 2.9. 
114 Ibid.  
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The CRPD Committee may provide some clarification on multiple 
mechanism article 33(2) frameworks in their upcoming concluding observations. 
Several countries that have included a classical ombudsman along with an A-status 
human rights commission in their article 33(2) multiple mechanism framework will 
soon be reviewed by the CRPD Committee. These include New Zealand and 
Denmark.115 Also, the reports of a few countries that have included thematic equality 
or disability rights institutions in their framework will soon be examined by the 
Committee. These include Croatia (relying on its Human Rights Ombudsman with 
ICC A-status accreditation and its thematic Disabilities Ombudsman), Sweden 
(relying tentatively on its Equality Ombudsman), and Lithuania (Equal Opportunities 
Ombudsperson and the ministerial Council for the Affairs of the Disabled).116 As a 
federal state, Mexico has designated its A-status National Human Rights 
Commission and its 32 state level human rights commissions as its article 33(2) 
framework.117 
 
 
4. Article 33(2) Framework, Ombudsman Institutions, and the Protection and 
Promotion of CRPD Rights 
 
Ombudsman institutions can play full or partial roles in article 33(2) frameworks for 
the protection, promotion, and monitoring of the implementation of CRPD rights. 
This section will address the mandates and activities of a selection of national human 
rights ombudsman institutions to illustrate how they are strong NHRI candidates for 
single or multiple institution article 33(2) frameworks. The mandates and activities 
of a selection of national and sub-national classical ombudsman institutions will also 
be surveyed to indicate how they can play CRPD protection and monitoring roles 
and could be included in a multiple institution article 33(2) framework along with a 
Paris Principles compliant NHRI. 
115 CRPD Committee, Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Initial 
reports submitted by States parties in accordance with article 35 of the Convention: New Zealand, CRPD, 
UN Doc CRPD/C/NZL/1 (advance, unedited version, March 2011) 57-58; CRPD Committee, 
Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Initial reports submitted by 
States parties in accordance with article 35 of the Convention: Denmark, CRPD, UN Doc 
CRPD/C/DNK/1 (advance, unedited version) 44-45; FRA, Fundamental Rights 2012, supra note 73 at 
148. 
116 CRPD Committee, Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Initial 
reports submitted by States parties in accordance with article 35 of the Convention: Croatia, CRPD, UN 
Doc CRPD/C/HRV/1 (2013) 234-235 (Croatia’s Ombudsperson for Persons with Disabilities has not 
applied for ICC accreditation); CRPD Committee, Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, Initial reports submitted by States parties in accordance with article 35 of the 
Convention: Sweden, CRPD, UN Doc CRPD/C/SWE/1, (2012) 351-353 (Sweden’s Equality Ombudsman 
has ICC B-status accreditation); CRPD Committee, Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, Initial reports submitted by States parties in accordance with article 35 of the 
Convention: Lithuania, CRPD, UN Doc CRPD/C/LTU/1 (advanced, unedited version) 320 (Lithuania’s 
Equal Opportunities Ombudsperson has not applied for ICC accreditation); FRA, Fundamental Rights 
2012, supra note 73 at 149. 
117 CRPD Committee, Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Initial 
reports submitted by States parties in accordance with article 35 of the Convention: Mexico, CRPD, UN 
Doc CRPD/C/MEX/1, (2013) 241. 
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(A) National Level Human Rights Ombudsman Institutions 
 
A national level human rights ombudsman institution will be an acceptable article 
33(2) framework mechanism as long as it is fully Paris Principles compliant or 
capable of moving from partial to full compliance. Also, the human rights 
ombudsman should have a unit dedicated to disability rights. 
 
 
National level human rights ombudsman institutions can protect CRPD 
rights through complaints-driven and own-motion investigations. For example, 
Spain’s Defensor del Pueblo has complaint-handling and other human rights 
protection powers in relation to the public authorities at all levels of governance.118 
Complaints concerning PWDs investigated by the Defensor in 2012 covered issues 
such as budget cuts that reduced teachers and staff for special needs students 
contrary to Spain’s CRPD obligations, the rights of patients in mental health care 
facilities, and inadequate social services for PWDs.119 Poland’s Public Defender has 
a similar broad range of powers and was also designated as an EU equality body in 
2011.120 In 2011, the Public Defender investigated complaints addressing disability 
rights in areas such as the rights to education and privacy and the rights of patients in 
mental health facilities 121  Argentina’s Defensor del Pueblo has investigated 
complaints and made recommendations for improvement in the protection of PWD 
rights relying on Argentina’s CRPD obligations in cases involving discriminatory 
treatment and inaccessible seating 122  Portugal’s Provider of Justice statute 
emphasizes that its own-motion investigation power is especially important for the 
protection and promotion of the rights of vulnerable persons, including PWDs.123 
Other examples of own-motion investigations are those conducted by Poland’s 
118 The Ombudsman, supra note 15 at 145-149. 
119 Resumen Informe Anual, supra note 105 at 50, 59-61. 
120 The Ombudsman, supra note 15 at 160-163; Human Rights Defender of the Republic of Poland, 
Summary of the Report on the Activity of the Human Rights Defender (Ombudsman of the Republic of 
Poland) in 2011, (2011), online: International Ombudsman Institute <www.theioi.org> [Poland Human 
Rights Defender 2011 Report]. 
121 Poland Human Rights Defender 2011 Report, ibid at 19-20, 50, 55-56. 
122 Argentina’s National Defensor del Pueblo, Recommendation 126/12 on abolition of legal requirement 
for PWDs to book tickets 48 hours in advance (CRPD art 3 general principles, art 5 equality before the 
law and reasonable accommodation), online: Argentina’s National Defensor del Pueblo 
<www.dpn.gob.ar/areas.php?id=04&cl=25&act=view>; Argentina’s National Defensor del Pueblo, 
Recommendation 45/11 on inaccessible seats for PWDs in motor carriers (American Convention on 
Human Rights, Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Persons with Disabilities, CRPD art 9 accessibility), online: Argentina’s National Defensor del Pueblo 
<www.dpn.gob.ar/areas.php?id=19&cl=25&act=view>.  
123 International Ombudsman Institute, “PORTUGAL: Third amendment to the Statute of the Portuguese 
Ombudsman” (26 February 2013), online: International Ombudsman Institute News 
<www.theioi.org/news/>.  
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Public Defender124 and Argentina’s Defensor del Pueblo.125  Some human rights 
ombudsman institutions can also inspect facilities where PWDs are involuntarily 
confined, such as prisons and psychiatric health facilities, thereby protecting and 
monitoring CRPD rights. Also, other public facilities should be inspected to ensure 
that they are accessible to PWDs. For example, in advance of parliamentary 
elections, personnel from Poland’s Public Defender institution inspected voting 
stations that were supposed to be accessible to PWDs, finding problems with most of 
the facilities.126 
 
 
Many human rights ombudsman institutions are given human rights 
protection powers to launch actions in constitutional and other courts. 127  These 
actions protect CRPD rights. For example, in 2011, Poland’s Public Defender 
brought a case before the Constitutional Court to challenge a provision in mental 
health legislation that stated that only minors aged sixteen and older needed to 
consent to psychiatric treatment when Polish civil law conferred limited legal 
capacity on children starting at the age of thirteen.128 In another 2011 Constitutional 
Court application by the Public Defender, the pension authority’s conduct in 
launching proceedings to re-examine existing entitlements to disability pensions was 
found to be unconstitutional.129 In addition to bringing actions arguing that laws are 
unconstitutional, Hungary’s Commissioner for Fundamental Rights can also bring 
Constitutional Court actions on the grounds that domestic law does not comply with 
the country’s treaty obligations, including the CRPD.130 
 
 
Human rights ombudsman institutions often have additional powers that can 
be employed to promote and monitor CRPD rights, such as engagement in law 
reform initiatives, advice on human rights treaty ratification, and human rights 
124 European Ombudsman, Newsletter No 19, supra note 23 at 15. This section is entitled: “The Polish 
Ombudsman publishes reports on equal treatment and public facilities for persons with disabilities”. 
125 Argentina’s National Defensor del Pueblo, “Defensor del Pueblo’s Own Motion Investigation on 
Protection of the Rights of Persons with Reduced Vision (Bastón Verde)” (3 September 2012), online: 
<www.dpn.gob.ar/areas.php?id=07&cl=25&act=view>; Argentina’s National Defensor del Pueblo, 
“Special Report on Agropoisons and Discapacity” (25 January 2012), online: Argentina’s National 
Defensor del Pueblo <www.dpn.gov.ar/areas.php?id=19&cl=25&act=view>.  
126 Poland Human Rights Defender 2011 Report, supra note 120 at 55. 
127 Transplantation and Adaptation, supra note 10 at 304-7; Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer, ed. European 
Ombudsman Institutions (New York: Springer, 2008) at 51-6, 354-5, 515-20. 
128 FRA, “Fundamental rights: challenges and achievements in 2011” (2012), online: European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights <fra.europa.eu> at 116; Judgment in the Name of the Republic of Poland, 
(11 October 2011) K 16/10, 80/8/A/2011. The Court held that the law did not violate the Constitution or 
the CRC. 
129 Poland Human Rights Defender 2011 Report, supra note 120 at 33-34. 
130 Maté Szabó, “Changes in the Institutional Context of the Ombudsman System in the Republic of 
Hungary in 2012” (2012) 3:3 Beijing L Rev 112 at 118. But see international concerns over changes to the 
Constitutional Court in FRA, Fundamental Rights 2012, supra note 73 at 234. 
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awareness raising, research, and education.131 Many also collaborate with the UN 
and regional human rights systems. 
 
 
(B) Classical Ombudsman Institutions Included in Multiple Institution 
Frameworks  
 
Classical ombudsman institutions have more limited exposure to human rights issues 
and more circumscribed responsibilities. However, they still play a role in protecting 
CRPD rights through their core functions of complaints-based and own-motion 
investigations, recommendations, and reporting. While classical ombudsman 
institutions rely predominantly on domestic law in their work, they also occasionally 
rely expressly on international human rights law such as the CRPD. 
 
 
For example, the Irish Ombudsman publishes formal reports on the 
conclusion of serious investigations. In recent years a material number have involved 
complaints brought by or on behalf of PWDs, including seniors with disabilities.132 
Similarly, the United Kingdom’s Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman has 
undertaken a number of investigations on PWDs, particularly under the health 
services component of the mandate. 133  In Canada, in 2011-2012 the British 
Columbia (BC) Ombudsperson investigated numerous cases concerning PWDs in the 
seniors, children and youth, driving, health, home support, and income and 
community support areas.134 The Ombudsperson has also conducted a number of 
131 See e.g., Poland Human Rights Defender 2011 Report, supra note 120 at 55. Poland’s Public Defender 
lobbied the government to ratify the CRPD and amend its domestic laws to comply with the CRPD. 
Poland consequently ratified the CRPD on 25 September 2012; Resumen Informe Anual, supra note 105 at 
58. Spain’s national and autonomous community defensores engaged in collaborative workshops on 
mental health rights; Bolivia’s Defensor del Pueblo, Las Personas con Discapacidad tienen una ley, 
online: Bolivia’s Defensor del Pueblo <www.defensoria.gob.bo/filesmaterial/flinfFOLLETO.pdf>. This is 
the May 2006 publication created for the general public regarding PWD rights. There are more 
publications created by Bolivia’s Defensor del Pueblo in this vein. 
132 See Ireland’s Office of the Ombudsman, Too Old to Be Equal? (April 2011, October 2012), online: 
Office of the Ombudsman < https://www.ombudsman.gov.ie/en/Publications/Investigation-
Reports/government-departments-other-public-bodies/Too-Old-to-be-Equal-/>. This publication discusses 
the Government’s refusal of mobility allowances to persons over 66 years of age through reliance on 
CRPD art 20, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights arts 21, 25, and the UN’s Principles for Older 
Persons; Ireland’s Office of the Ombudsman, Publications, online: 
<https://www.ombudsman.gov.ie/en/Publications/>. Examples of publications include: Passengers with 
Disabilities (2001), Report on the Provision of School Transport for a Child with Disabilities (February 
1998), and various reports on treatment of seniors with disabilities.  
133 The United Kingdom’s Parliamentary and Health Services Ombudsman, online: Parliamentary and 
Health Service Ombudsman <http://www.ombudsman.org.uk/>. Examples of relevant reports include: A 
report by the Health Service Ombudsman and the Local Government Ombudsman about the care and 
support provided to a person with Down’s Syndrome (November 2011); Report by the Parliamentary and 
Health Service Ombudsman on Complaints About Disability Issues (October 2011); Care and 
Compassion? (February 2011); Six lives: The provision of public services to people with learning 
disabilities (March 2009).  
134 British Columbia, Canada Office of the Ombudsperson, Annual Report 2011-12 (British Columbia: 
Ombudsperson, 2012) at 21-24, 29, 35-36, 39, 44, 46-47, 51-53. 
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systemic investigations over the years that pertain to PWDs, including on seniors 
involuntarily detained in residential care and on the province’s Public Guardian 
system that relied on the CRPD.135 The Quebec Protecteur du citoyen has issued 
special reports on improving government services for persons with pervasive 
development disorders and accessibility of home support services for PWDs.136 The 
Ontario Ombudsman has conducted systemic investigations on issues such as parents 
having to give up custody of their severely disabled children to get residential 
treatment services for them, nine year waits for disabled support payments, 
inadequate mental health services for children of military personnel, and the use of 
excessive force against prisoners, including those with disabilities.137 In late 2012, 
the Ontario Ombudsman received numerous complaints concerning the province’s 
inadequate services for young adults with developmental disabilities and launched a 
special investigation.138 
 
 
Some classical ombudsman institutions have additional powers such as 
inspections of closed facilities and the review of deaths of persons in care which 
further the protection and monitoring of CRPD rights. For example, the BC 
Ombudsperson has inspection powers.139 In addition to investigations and inquiries, 
the New South Wales (NSW) Ombudsman reviews the deaths of PWDs living in 
residential care or licensed boarding houses, coordinates official community visitors’ 
work in visiting and monitoring licensed homes for PWDs, and monitors, reviews, 
135 British Columbia, Canada Office of the Ombudsperson, No Longer Your Decision: British Columbia’s 
Process for Appointing the Public Guardian and Trustee to Manage the Financial Affairs of Incapable 
Adults, Public Report No 49 (British Columbia: Legislative Assembly of British Columbia, 2013) at 20, 
115 [BC Ombudsperson Public Guardian Report]; British Columbia, Canada The Office of the 
Ombudsperson, The Best of Care: Getting it Right for Seniors in British Columbia, Public Report 47 (Part 
2) (British Columbia: Legislative Assembly of British Columbia, 2012); The Office of the Ombudsperson, 
The Best of Care: Getting it Right for Seniors in British Columbia, Public Report 46 (Part 1) (British 
Columbia: Legislative Assembly of British Columbia, 2009). See also the following British Columbia 
Office of the Ombudsperson public reports: Abuse of Deaf Students at Jericho Hill School, Public Report 
No 32 (British Columbia: Legislative Assembly of British Columbia, 1993); Listening: A Review of 
Riverview Hospital, Public Report No 33 (British Columbia: Legislative Assembly of British Columbia, 
1993). Please note that this report pertained to the hospital treatment of psychiatric patients; Public 
Services for Adult Dependent Persons, Public Report No 25 (British Columbia: Legislative Assembly of 
British Columbia, 1991). 
136 See e.g., Quebec Le Protecteur du Citoyen, Is Home Support Always the Option of Choice? 
Accessibility of home support services for people with significant and persistent disabilities (Quebec City: 
Quebec Ombudsman, 2012); Quebec Le Protecteur du Citoyen, Services Provided to Young People and 
Adults with a Pervasive Development Disorder: From Government Commitment to Cold Hard Facts: 
Special Ombudsman’s Report (Quebec City: Quebec Ombudsman, 2012). 
137 Ontario Ombudsman, Investigation: Adults with developmental disabilities in crisis (Ottawa: Ministry 
of Community and Social Services, 2012), online: Ombudsman Ontario <www.ombudsman.on.ca/>.  
138 Ontario Ombudsman, “New Investigation Draws Hundreds of Complaints: Ontario’s Services for 
Adults with Developmental Disabilities” The Watchdog (Ontario Ombudsman, February 2013). For 
instance, services end when youth reach 18 years of age. 
139 Ombudsperson Act, RSBC 1996, c 340, s 15(2)(a). 
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and establishes standards for the provision of services for PWDs. 140  In work 
supporting PWDs, the NSW Ombudsman has relied on the CRPD.141 
 
 
As noted earlier, some classical ombudsman institutions are being 
designated alongside a Paris Principles compliant NHRI in a multiple institution 
article 33(2) framework. One example is the New Zealand multi-body article 33(2) 
framework, composed of the New Zealand Human Rights Commission, the New 
Zealand Ombudsmen, and the Convention Coalition of PWD organizations. The 
three bodies work together to protect, promote, and monitor the implementation of 
the CRPD. The New Zealand Human Rights Commission engages in a range of 
CRPD promotion and monitoring functions and can uphold CRPD anti-
discrimination/harassment obligations.142 The New Zealand Ombudsmen carry out 
broad CRPD protection functions through their investigations on receipt of a 
complaint and on their own-motion against New Zealand government authorities.143 
Their investigations have included those on health ministry home modification 
reimbursement policies, examination policies and procedures for students with 
disabilities, reasonable accommodation of and health care for prisoners with 
disabilities, and difficulties for PWDs in communicating with government entities.144 
The Ombudsmen and Human Rights Commission were also designated as OPCAT 
NPM mechanisms. This function can also assist in protecting CRPD rights. In 
fulfilling their OPCAT NPM duties, the New Zealand Ombudsmen monitor and 
inspect facilities where PWDs may be confined and make recommendations for 
protection of human rights.145 Problematic treatment in psychiatric and intellectual 
disability units have been the subject of inspection reports containing findings and 
recommendations, and have led to changes in government procedures.146 
 
140 See New South Wales Ombudsman Community Services, Disability Services, Reviewable Deaths 
Services & Coordinating Responsibilities of Official Community Visitors, online: New South Wales 
Ombudsman Community Services <www.ombo.nsw.gov.au/>. Please note that the “Official Community 
Visitors” include PWDs and relatives of PWDs. Furthermore, the Ombudsman submits a biennial report to 
the legislature on reviewable disability deaths.  
141 Ibid. 
142 New Zealand Human Rights Commission, online: Human Rights Commission <www.hrc.co.nz>. 
143 New Zealand Ombudsman, 2010/2011 Report of the Ombudsman (Wellington: Office of the 
Ombudsman, 2012) at 12, 48 [New Zealand Ombudsman 2010/2011 Report].  
144 Ibid at 48-51; New Zealand 2011-2012 Independent Monitoring Mechanism Annual Report, supra note 
5 at 14, 36-37, 40-47, 57-59, 68-75.  
145 New Zealand Ombudsman, 2009/2010 Report of the Ombudsman (Wellington: Office of the 
Ombudsman, 2010) at 17. 
146 Ibid at 41, 44-45. This reference pertains to seclusion in intellectual disabilities units for unreasonably 
long periods of time; New Zealand Ombudsman 2010/2011 Report, supra note 143 at 44-46. This 
reference pertains to the improper classification and detention of persons with intellectual disabilities 
under mental health legislation. It further discusses the inadequate record-keeping for persons subject to 
court orders for concurrent prison and hospital detention. This reference also talks about the poor 
treatment of prison inmates with psychosocial disabilities. 
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The three bodies in the New Zealand framework are also working together 
to inter alia monitor, advise, and report on the domestic implementation of the 
CRPD, address legislation, policy, and practice affecting PWDs and report annually 
to Parliament.147 The framework also collaborates with the UN human rights system. 
The framework will report periodically to the CRPD Committee on domestic 
implementation of the CRPD. 148  In its first annual report to Parliament, the 
framework stated that some of its recommendations “reinforce recommendations 
previously made to New Zealand by international committees.”149 
 
 
5. Article 33(2) Multiple Institution Frameworks and Paris Principles 
Compliance 
 
The CRPD Committee has not yet taken a clear position on whether all the 
institutions in a multiple institution article 33(2) framework must comply with the 
Paris Principles. If the Committee does take this position, then it will not be possible 
for CRPD states, including federal states such as Canada, to include multiple 
institutions in its article 33(2) framework. 
 
 
Gauthier de Beco has addressed the application of the Paris Principles to 
multiple mechanism article 33(2) frameworks. He argues that:  
 
By referring to the Paris Principles, the drafters of CRPD applied the 
guidelines for NHRIs to actors other than NHRIs [since disability rights 
bodies will likely be involved, so that] the Paris Principles will have to be 
read in light of the specific mandate of these mechanisms.150  
 
Further, de Beco has taken a favourable position on multiple independent 
mechanisms in an article 33(2) framework (e.g., a NHRI and a thematic equality 
body). He takes this position because “[i]t both increases the chances of covering the 
full mandate of independent mechanisms and ensures the participation of persons 
147 New Zealand 2011-2012 Independent Monitoring Mechanism Annual Report, supra note 5 at 13; New 
Zealand Ombudsman, Making disability rights real (Wellington: Office of the Ombudsman, 2010), online: 
New Zealand Ombudsman <www.Ombudsman.parliament.nz>. 
148 Ibid at 10. This is likely in late 2014 or thereafter. Further, the Ombudsman investigations and 
inspections inform these reports. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Article 33(2), supra note 90 at 93; See also Gauthier de Beco & Alexander Hoefmans, “National 
Structures for the Implementation and Monitoring of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities” in Article 33, supra note 33, 9 at 38 [National Structures]. Regarding children with 
disabilities see UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre’s (now Office of Research) recommendation: 
“[d]evelop independent monitoring mechanisms, such as an Ombudsperson or Children’s Commissioner, 
and ensure that children and families are aware of and fully supported in gaining access to such 
mechanisms,” Promoting the Rights of Children with Disabilities, supra note 1 at v. 
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with disabilities.”151 Yet, de Beco also argues that when multiple institutions are 
appointed to an article 33(2) framework all of them should be fully compliant with 
the Paris Principles.152 However, in later work de Beco and Hoefmans focus more on 
the independence and pluralism of institutions as criteria for inclusion in the 
framework. 153 They therefore appear to accept that the Paris Principles must be 
adapted so they can be applied to a broader array of domestic institutions as long as 
the institutions satisfy core standards of the Paris Principles, such as independence 
and pluralism. 
 
 
The Mental Disability Advocacy Centre (MDAC) also argues that all of the 
institutions in a multiple mechanism article 33(2) framework should comply fully 
with the Paris Principles.154 However, MDAC’s prime concern in taking this position 
is that all of the bodies must be independent from government so that they can 
operate impartially and without government interference.155 Furthermore, MDAC’s 
focus on independence and its call for “adaptation” of the Paris Principles in the 
application of the CRPD results in MDAC suggesting that thematic human rights 
institutions, ombudsman institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), trade 
unions, and universities could be included along with a NHRI in a multiple-
mechanism article 33(2) framework.156 MDAC does not take ICC interpretation of 
the Paris Principles into account and appears to equate the Principles simply with 
independence from the executive/administrative branch of government. However, 
the Paris Principles do not apply, and cannot be adapted to apply, to NGOs, trade 
unions, and universities. 
 
 
State internal structures can be complex. For example, federal states, states 
with advisory human rights commissions, and states with thematic institutions such 
as disability rights institutions are countries where multiple institutions are necessary 
or may be necessary to cover the article 33(2) framework requirements of protecting, 
promoting, and monitoring CRPD rights. These domestic realities, the text of article 
33(2), and scholarly views on article 33(2) support the argument in favour of 
permitting flexibility in the CRPD Committee’s application of the Paris Principles to 
multiple institution article 33(2) frameworks. 
151 CRPD Article 33 Implementation in Europe, supra note 92 at 53, 6-7; National Structures, ibid at 44-
45, 53-54. 
152 Article 33(2), supra note 90 at 94. 
153 National Structures, supra note 150 at 38-39.  
154 Mental Disability Advocacy Center, Building the Architecture for Change: Guidelines on Article 33 of 
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons With Disabilities, 1st ed (Budapest, Hungary: Mental 
Disability Advocacy Center, 2011), online: Mental Disability Advocacy Center 
<www.mdac.info/en/about> at 39. The Mental Disability Advocacy Center (“MDAC”) is an international 
non-governmental human rights organization headquartered in Budapest, Hungary. 
155 Ibid at 39-40.  
156 Ibid at 41, 47. 
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It is my view that the CRPD Committee should permit multiple institutional 
frameworks under article 33(2) as long as one of the institutions is a NHRI that fully 
complies with the Paris Principles or is easily capable of upgrading from partial to 
full compliance. The NHRI must be a national level human rights commission or 
human rights ombudsman. Additional statutory institutions such as classical 
ombudsman institutions, thematic human rights institutions, and sub-national human 
rights commissions should also be acceptable mechanisms for inclusion as long as 
they comply with most of the ICC-designated essential requirements of the Paris 
Principles. 157  These are: independence from government, adequate resources to 
enable the institution to carry out its mandate effectively, the ability to interact with 
the international human rights system and cooperate with other human rights bodies 
in the execution of its CRPD article 33(2) responsibilities, the ability to issue annual, 
special, and thematic reports that include recommendations to the public authorities 
on improving respect for CRPD rights, pluralism in the makeup of the leadership and 
staff of the institution, and pluralism and transparency in the selection and 
appointment of the institutional leadership.158 The essential requirement of the Paris 
Principles that an institution must have a legal mandate that includes the promotion 
and protection of all human rights should be adapted to permit the inclusion in a 
multiple institution framework of other national and sub-national statutory 
institutions whose legal mandate expressly or in practice permits the institution to 
promote and/or protect CRPD disability rights. Also, the institutions included in a 
multiple institution framework must in combination fulfill all of the article 33(2) 
promotion, protection, and oversight roles. 
 
 
Given the supranational nature of the EU, the essential requirements of the 
Paris Principles will also have to be applied flexibly or other criteria applied when 
the EU’s article 33(2) framework is evaluated. 159 Since PWD organizations are 
typically private actors the Paris Principles do not apply to them. However, the 
formal inclusion of PWD organizations by state parties in their article 33(2) 
frameworks is an important development that upholds the core principles of the 
CRPD in general and article 33(3) in particular so the CRPD Committee should 
welcome their inclusion in an article 33(2) framework as long as they are 
independent of government. 
 
 
 
157 See National Structures, supra note 150 at 38-39, 44-45, 52-55. Authors de Beco and Hoefmans have 
also taken the position that, in addition to a NHRI, other independent mechanisms can be part of an art 
33(2) framework. However, their analysis does not address the ICC General Observations and 
accreditation process and they appear to equate independence and pluralism of an institution with Paris 
Principles full compliance.  
158 Supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. 
159 See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text. 
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6. Canada and Article 33(2) 
 
Canada published its first report to the CRPD Committee on February 18, 2014.160 
The report stated that: 
 
Canada’s framework pursuant to Article 33(2) is comprised of several 
elements, including government reporting and promotional activities, and 
the work of… [federal, provincial, and territorial] human rights 
commissions and tribunals, the courts, public guardians and 
ombudspersons and civil society organizations across Canada. Combined, 
these mechanisms play a role in promoting, protecting and monitoring the 
rights set out in the Convention. After giving careful consideration to the 
offer by the Canadian Human Rights Commission to be designated to 
carry out monitoring functions in respect of the Convention, Canada 
determined that it could maintain and rely on existing mechanisms to 
fulfill its obligations under Article 33(2).161 
 
As discussed earlier, Canada’s federal system is such that an article 33(2) multiple 
institution framework with federal and provincial/territorial institutional mechanisms 
must be established since disability rights fall under both federal and provincial 
heads of power.162 Article 33(2) does permit a CRPD state party to “maintain … 
designate or establish” a multiple institutional framework, although it also states that 
the mechanism(s) included in the framework shall be “designated or established” 
taking the Paris Principles into account. The inconsistent wording makes it difficult 
to determine whether the CRPD Committee will find Canada’s laissez faire approach 
acceptable under article 33(2) or will call for Canada to make a formal designation of 
the institutional mechanisms included in its framework. Canada’s constitutional 
division of powers limits the federal government’s freedom of action. The federal 
government can designate federal institutions as article 33(2) mechanisms. However, 
only the provincial/territorial governments can consent to the designation of their 
institutions as article 33(2) mechanisms. There is no indication in Canada’s report 
that they were asked or have done so. 
 
 
In any event, based on the concluding observations of the CRPD Committee 
and the Paris Principles, government activities will not be considered to be 
sufficiently independent to meet the requirements of article 33(2) and the 
courts/tribunals are not considered NHRIs or other statutory institutions for the 
160 Government of Canada, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: First Report of Canada 
(Ottawa: Ministry of Heritage and Official Languages, 2014) [First Report of Canada]. 
161 Ibid at para 44. 
162 See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text; First Report of Canada, supra note 160 at para 3. The 
First Report of Canada notes that based on 2006 statistics, 14.3% of Canadians had disabilities and about 
43% of seniors had disabilities, ibid at paras 6-7. 
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protection of human rights.163 Public guardians are typically sufficiently connected 
to government administration that it is likely that they would not satisfy the 
independence requirement in article 33(2) and the Paris Principles.164  
 
 
The Canadian Human Rights Commission has ICC A-status NHRI 
accreditation and should have been formally designated as the NHRI in Canada’s 
framework. 165  Also, based on my argument above, in addition to the Canadian 
Human Rights Commission, provincial/territorial ombudsman institutions and 
human rights commissions can be included as important components of Canada’s 
multiple institutional framework as long as they meet most of the Paris Principles’ 
essential requirements. The one essential requirement that should be relaxed is the 
mandate to protect and promote all human rights. The ombudsman institutions 
should be able to meet this test. As officers of the legislature, Canadian 
provincial/territorial ombudsman institutions are independent, enjoy adequate 
resources and, as demonstrated above, they already engage in investigations against 
public authorities that protect CRPD rights. 166  They issue public reports with 
recommendations to government, they are capable of interacting with international 
human rights actors and other human rights bodies, they are pluralistic in their 
leadership and staff, and there is transparency and pluralism in the appointment of 
the ombudsman pursuant to ICC interpretation of the Paris Principles.167 Provincial 
and territorial human rights commissions have jurisdiction over the public and 
private sectors and they can protect, promote, and monitor primarily CRPD non-
discrimination rights 168 However, provincial and territorial governments need to 
consent to any formal designation of their institutions and provide any additional 
resources and legislative reforms necessary to fulfil the article 33(2) mandate. 
Working together, the Canadian Human Rights Commission and the sub-national 
ombudsman institutions and human rights commissions should fulfil the CRPD 
article 33(2) protect, promote, and monitor obligations. Canada should also consider 
designating one or more independent disability rights organizations as part of its 
163 See e.g., ICC Report and Recommendations May 2013, supra note 41 at General Observation 2.10; 
supra note 110 and accompanying text. The courts/tribunals are important, albeit different, sites for the 
implementation of CRPD rights protection.  
164 See BC Ombudsperson investigation into the BC Public Guardian in BC Ombudsperson Public 
Guardian Report, supra note 135. 
165 Status of National Institutions, supra note 41; Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6. The 
Canadian Human Rights Commission has A-status even though focus of Commission is on non-
discrimination and equality. Also, while  Commission members appointed by Governor in Council they 
are removable only on address of Senate and House of Commons. 
166 See supra notes 134-139, 164 and accompanying text. 
167 See ICC Report and Recommendations May 2013, supra note 41 at General Observations 1.4-1.10. 
 
168 First Report of Canada, supra note 160 at 11-12. Many sub-national human rights commissions are 
appointed by and report to their governments; but see Status of National Institutions, supra note 41 (ICC 
A-status Canadian Human Rights Commission appointed by federal executive). The differences in 
jurisdiction, independence, and other powers of Canadian sub-national human rights commissions are 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
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article 33(2) framework following New Zealand’s example. Further, inclusion of the 
federal Correctional Investigator in Canada’s article 33(2) framework should be 
considered, for example if its independence from government is enhanced.169 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Classical, human rights, and thematic ombudsman institutions exist at supranational, 
national, and sub-national levels of government. Article 33(2) of the CRPD requires 
that a framework of one or more independent domestic mechanisms be used to 
protect, promote, and monitor the implementation of the treaty, taking into account 
the Paris Principles that contain the minimum standards for the legal and financial 
architecture of NHRIs. Human rights, classical, and thematic ombudsman 
institutions are being appointed as CRPD article 33(2) mechanisms. 
 
 
Article 33(2) is being interpreted by the CRPD Committee through 
application of the Paris Principles. Based on CRPD Committee recommendations, 
the Paris Principles, and the ICC’s General Observations when a state designates one 
institution for an article 33(2) framework, only a national level human rights 
commission or national level human rights ombudsman institution that complies with 
the Paris Principles and has an internal unit dedicated to disability rights will be 
acceptable. National level classical ombudsman or thematic human rights institutions 
standing alone will not comply with the Paris Principles and will not satisfy the 
requirements of article 33(2). 
 
 
This article argues that the CRPD Committee should accept multiple 
institutional frameworks under article 33(2) as long as one of the institutions in the 
framework is a NHRI that fully complies with or is easily capable of fully complying 
with the Paris Principles. Additional independent institutions such as national 
classical ombudsman institutions, national thematic rights institutions, and sub-
national human rights institutions and classical ombudsman institutions in 
federal/decentralized states should also be acceptable mechanisms for inclusion in an 
article 33(2) multiple body framework as long as they comply with most of the 
essential requirements of the Paris Principles. These are: independence from 
government, adequate resources to enable the institution to carry out its mandate 
effectively, the ability to interact with international human rights system actors and 
cooperate with other human rights bodies in the execution of CRPD article 33(2) 
responsibilities, the ability to issue public reports that include recommendations to 
the authorities on improving respect for CRPD rights, pluralism in the makeup of the 
institution’s leadership and staff, and pluralism and transparency in the selection and 
169 Assisting prisoners with disabilities is already a priority area for the Correctional Investigator.  The 
institution is enshrined in legislation, but is appointed by, and can be removed for cause at any time by, 
the Governor in Council.  Transparency and pluralism in the appointment process could also be an issue, 
Corrections and Conditional Release Act, SC 1992, c 20, Part III, ss 158, 160(1); supra note 5; Canada, 
<Office of the Correctional Investigator, online: www.oci-bec.gc.ca>. 
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appointment of the institution’s leadership. The Paris Principles requirement that the 
institution have a legal mandate that includes the promotion and protection of all 
human rights should be adapted to permit the inclusion of national and sub-national 
institutions whose legal mandate expressly or in practice permits the institution to 
promote and/or protect CRPD disability rights. Also, the institutions working 
together in an article 33(2) framework must fulfill all of the article 33(2) promotion, 
protection, and oversight roles. Accordingly, Canada’s article 33(2) multiple 
institution framework should consist of the Canadian Human Rights Commission as 
the ICC A-status NHRI, provincial/territorial ombudsman institutions and human 
rights commissions as long as they comply with or are capable of complying with 
most of the essential requirements of the Paris Principles as adapted for these types 
of sub-national institutions, and possibly also the federal Correctional Investigator 
and one or more PWD civil society organizations.  
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APPENDIX: ACRONYMS 
 
BC   British Columbia 
CERMI Spain’s Committee of Representatives of Persons with 
Disabilities 
COE Council of Europe 
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child 
CRPD   Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
CRPD Committee Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
EU European Union 
FRA EU Agency for Fundamental Rights 
ICC International Coordinating Committee of National 
Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights 
MDAC Mental Disability Advocacy Centre 
NGO non-governmental organization 
NHRIs   national human rights institutions 
NPM national preventive mechanism 
NSW New South Wales 
OB Austrian Ombudsman Board 
OPCAT Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment  
PWDs   persons with disabilities 
UN   United Nations 
